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Abstract 
The CityMobil project “Towards advanced transport for the urban environment” aims at achieving a 
more effective organisation of urban transport, resulting in a more rational use of motorised traffic with 
less congestion and pollution, safer driving, a higher quality of living and an enhanced integration with 
spatial development. This paper describes a certification procedure for automated transport systems, 
developed in various European research projects and completed in the CityMobil project. The paper also 
describes the first experiences with the procedure. Furthermore the paper describes experiences with 
certification processes of automated systems in various countries where systems have been introduced. 
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1. Introduction 
The city of tomorrow is in need of integrated traffic solutions that provide the required mobility in an 
efficient, safe and economic manner. It is inevitable that automation, in all possible forms between 
providing information at one end of the spectrum and fully autonomous driving at the other, will play a 
major role. In the future fully automated transport systems will become a part of everyday life. However, 
before these systems can be introduced on any scale, a number of barriers need to be removed. One of 
these barriers is the absence of a dedicated certification system, to prove to stakeholders that the systems 
indeed are safe. For many different technical systems procedures and standards exist, that deal with the 
analysis of the safety and with the certification of these systems, but for automated transport systems such 
standards did not yet exist. This paper describes a certification procedure, developed in various European 
research projects and completed in the CityMobil project [1]. The paper also describes the first 
experiences with the procedure in two systems: The Masdar Personal Rapid Transport (PRT) system in 
Abu Dhabi and the CityMobil Rome demonstrator in Italy.  
Furthermore the paper describes experiences with certification processes for automated systems in 
various countries where systems have been introduced. Transportation is a global matter and standards 
will certainly play a central role in certification. But which standards? There are several other paths that 
are currently independently explored in the world, from TÜV in Germany to Google in Nevada (USA). 
Taking these developments into account, the paper drafts a blueprint for the future steps in the 
standardization of certification of automated transport systems.  
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The CityMobil project was built on the results of recent European and national projects [2, 3] and has 
validated and demonstrated the capabilities of new mobility solutions in different European cities. In 5 
horizontal sub-projects the issues that still prevent full scale implementation of innovative automated 
transport systems have been identified and investigated and solutions have been developed. At two sites 
large scale demonstrators were set up to supply proof of concept of innovative transport systems 
integrated in the urban environment. In a number of cities smaller demonstration activities have been 
organised to show to the public, authorities and operators what automated transport can look like. 
CityMobil started in May 2006 and was finished in December 2011. The project was carried out by a 
group of 29 partners from very different backgrounds like industry, R&D, universities, cities and 
operators of public transport and from 10 different countries. The consortium was led by TNO, the 
Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research. The total budget was roughly 40 million 
Euros, of which 11 million was funded by the EU. 
 
 
2. The CityMobil certification procedures 
 
2.1 The safety analysis process 
 
The draft certification procedures consist of four steps. If these steps have been followed with a positive 
result, the system is considered safe enough to be introduced. The four steps are: 
: 
a. Preliminary risk reduction 
b. Determine which safety regulations apply 
c. Production and implementation of the system 
d. Certification 
 
a.  Preliminary risk reduction  
In the first step the risk reduction method [4] is used to roughly analyse a number of variables that have 
influence on the safety of the transport system in its environment. The basis of the analysis is a series of 
checklists that take into account a number of actors present in the environment and estimate their 
influence on the safety of the system. The analysis is carried out by the authorities, the operator and the 
evaluation organization. The result is a series of recommendations that can be applied in the first planning 
phase. By following the recommendations, fewer corrections will need to be made in the later stages.  
 
b. Determine which safety regulations apply 
In the second step it is established which existing safety regulations the system should meet. In addition 
to the safety evaluation and certification procedure, most systems will have to meet particular 
requirements, related to the environment they are being used in. For instance, requirements concerning 
the applicability for disabled people or local fire regulations. The second step is carried out by the 
authorities and the evaluation organization. 
 
c. Production and implementation of the system 
In the third step, for which the manufacturer of the system in combination with the operator is 
responsible, the system is produced and implemented on site. For the production phase it is highly 
advisable to follow the Code of Practice for the design and evaluation of Advanced Driver Assistance 
(ADA) systems, as developed in the Response projects [5]. Although the recommendations in this Code 
of Practice are meant for standard cars with drivers, most of the recommendations are directly applicable 
to fully automated systems and can greatly improve the safety of a system if applied correctly.  
 
d. Certification 
In the final step the system is certified, using the certification procedures described in section 2.6. An 
independent evaluator should carry out the procedure, until, after formal acceptance of the procedures by 
the European authorities a notified body will take over this task. 
 
2.2 Requirements 
 
Certification procedures need to meet a number of requirements in order to be truly considered 
certification procedures. Furthermore there are considerations, limitations and choices to be made, 
depending on the particular circumstances of the system that needs to be certified. The paragraphs below 
describe those requirements, choices and limitations. 
• Certification procedures should be based on the system safety approach and the safety life cycle. 
 Life cycle safety is one of the major topics in system safety analysis. The concept of life cycle safety 
is that safety is an issue during the whole design cycle of the product and that safety not only 
concerns the period the product is being used, but the complete period from the first concept until 
the end of  the life of the system. The big advantage of the life cycle approach is that safety issues 
are raised and solved in an early stage of system development and in this way can avoid more 
radical and expensive changes further down the development path.  
• Certification procedures should contain performance criteria instead of design criteria. 
 In order to guarantee that innovations offer the maximum benefits, limitations to design choices by 
means of design criteria should be avoided. Performance criteria guarantee that a system meets the 
required performance without preventing the designer from making the most economic choices.  
• Certification procedures should include a rating system so that a quantitative assessment is possible. 
 Almost all present standards and regulations include quantitative requirements that components or 
complete systems must meet in order to be approved. When, like in the case of automated transport 
systems, the system to be assessed is a complicated integrated system with large software content, 
simple component testing of for instance a steering or braking system is not sufficient anymore. 
Since the braking and steering systems are part of a much larger integrated system everything 
influences everything and simple input-output testing does not give the required answers. Here 
system safety acceptance levels must be defined and an analysis method with which it is possible to 
establish whether or not a system meets the defined level must be used. In order to define system 
safety acceptance levels the question: "how safe is safe enough" should be answered. 
• Certification procedures should define acceptance levels for different kinds of vehicles. 
 The present motor vehicle regulations specify several categories of vehicles for which different 
requirements are defined. Parameters like mass and maximum speed of motor vehicles have a strong 
influence on safety. The safety requirements of, for instance cybercars should reflect the fact that 
they, because of their limited weight and speed are relatively safe in comparison with traditional 
cars. 
• Certification procedures should use relevant existing standards and follow developments in 
standards for related vehicle types carefully. 
 
Some automated transport systems will use the same road infrastructure as traditional cars and it would be 
preferable when all systems that are being used on public roads meet the same requirements. Therefore it 
is not only important to refer to existing standards, but also to carefully follow developments in relevant 
standards. In addition, a number of practical requirements can be defined that ensure that the analysis 
method is fit for use. The method has to fulfil the needs of several parties who are involved in the 
decisions concerning the safety of automated transport systems.  
• User friendliness: The method must be easy to use, so that people from different backgrounds can 
use it with a minimum of training. 
4  
• Uniformity: The method must be suitable for analysis of almost every vehicle system, vehicle or 
vehicle component without the need for special adaptations. 
• Reproducibility: The results should be the same, independent of the people that carry out the 
analysis. 
• Acceptability: In order for a method to be acceptable, it should have a firm basis in existing 
standards. 
 
2.3 Relevant standards 
 
Although there are no standards immediately available for the system analysis of an automatic guided 
vehicle system, starting points can be found in existing standards. The most important one is IEC 61508: 
Functional Safety of electrical/electronic/ programmable electronic safety-related systems [6]. IEC 61508 
is a generic standard in which amongst others Safety Integrity Levels are defined. A system meets the 
requirements of IEC 61508 if its Safety Integrity Level is in accordance with the level prescribed for that 
particular system. Another important standard that was used as a reference is the new ISO 26262: 
Functional safety. This ISO standard is an adaptation of IEC61508, particularly for use with Advanced 
Driver Assistance systems (ADAS) in road vehicles. Although ISO 26262 is meant for vehicles with 
drivers, it was of great benefit to the development of the present standard for driverless systems and care 
has been taken to make use of similarities between the standards where possible. 
 
As the basis for the system safety analysis method the Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) was chosen. Literature describes many methods for system safety analysis. The System Safety 
Analysis Handbook [7] for instance, describes over a hundred methods. The FMECA has the advantage 
that it is extensively used in the vehicle industry and that most developers have either heard of it or have 
contributed to one. The FMECA is not the only analysis method that would be suitable. It was considered 
to add other methods to the method, for instance a Fault Tree Analysis. That would increase the accuracy 
of the result but it would have an adverse effect on the user-friendliness of the method and especially on 
the time consumed with an analysis. An important consideration to limit the method to the FMECA was 
that all traditional certification tests are in fact compromises. A product has to meet certain requirements 
when it is tested under well-defined standard conditions. When the conditions are slightly different, like 
in a real situation the product will not perform the same way and might not even meet the certification 
requirements. Since the method is a certification instrument and since the requirement of user friendliness 
is considered important it was decided not to include other methods. The FMECA is per definition a 
subjective analysis method. In a typical FMECA 4 - 5 people use their knowledge and experience to 
systematically list all possible failure modes of the system to be analysed. Then the causes and effects of 
these failure modes are established and severity and likelihood of the effects are rated. The reproducibility 
of the result depends on the knowledge of the participants but also strongly on the strictness with which 
the procedure is being followed. In order to guarantee an acceptable reproducibility, so that different 
groups of analysts reach the same conclusions, the analysis process is defined in detail and the process 
moderator has to monitor the process strictly in order to guarantee the procedure is being followed.  
 
2.4  References: "how safe is safe enough" 
 
Whether or not a transport system or any other system is safe enough depends on the risk that is accepted 
in a given context based on the current social criteria. For traditional road vehicles "safe enough" is made 
concrete by establishing limits that vehicles should meet under well described and realistic test 
conditions. For intelligent transport systems like cybercars this is not possible, since the number of 
variables that influences the results of a test is so high that testing would cost too much time and money. 
This means that "safe enough" for automated transport systems should be defined differently. The choice 
made in this procedure is to base "safe enough" on the safety of comparable systems. For innovative 
systems, like automated transport systems it is possible to state that they should be safer than comparable 
traditional vehicles in the same class. Safety or the lack of safety can be expressed in various units. In 
statistics the number of casualties per traveller-kilometre is often used. Safety is thus expressed on the 
basis of the seriousness of an accident and the distance travelled. In this proposal we express safety as the 
number of casualties per travelled hour. Safety is expressed in terms of the seriousness of an accident and 
the time a person spends travelling. The risks connected with one hour walking or one hour flying an 
airplane is perceived as a more realistic means of comparison than the risks of travelling a certain 
distance. 
 
When, for instance, we know that in Europe there are 6 casualties per billion travelled kilometres in 
passenger cars (Eurostat 1997) and when we assume that the average speed driven by passenger cars is 60 
kph we can calculate that there will be 36 x 10-8  casualties per hour travelled. Or expressed differently: 
the chance to die each hour as a result of an accident with a passenger car is 1 on 2.8 million.  
Another consideration is the contrast between "as safe as possible" and "as safe as necessary" The last 
expression encompasses an accepted level of risks. The idea of this approach is that it is not possible to 
ban all the risks from the lives of people but the harm that a system can cause should be limited to a level 
that is generally deemed acceptable. This approach is also used in IEC 61508. 
 
2.5  Limitations 
 
Human Factors 
The guidelines, as presented in this report are not only meant for the analysis of technical systems. 
Human factors can play a role in the analysis. This is understandable if we realize that automated 
transport systems are not controlled by human drivers, but that humans nevertheless play a role, by being 
passengers or by controlling central systems,  carrying out maintenance, repairs etc.  
 
Software 
Software is a difficult subject in any safety analysis. How can a judgement be made as to whether or not 
software is safe? Certainly in complicated control software like that in automated transport systems the 
number of possibilities for failure is very large. It is generally acknowledged that it is risky to make firm 
statements based on tests about the safety of complicated software. The more extensive and complex the 
software is the more tests are necessary to exclude all possible failure modes. A more realistic approach 
therefore is to follow generally accepted design rules during the design phase. By strictly following such 
design rules (for instance the IEEE Software Engineering Standards [8]) the risk of failure will be 
minimised. These standards give recipes for developing the software and also for documentation. When 
the design rules are followed and the software meets its functional specifications the chance of failure can 
be deemed to be small.  
 
Present laws 
In order to be approved for use on public roads, present laws require the presence of a driver in a motor 
vehicle. Since automated transport systems do not have a human driver, they cannot be approved under 
the present laws. This can be interpreted in two ways: 1: automated transport systems are not allowed to 
use public roads and 2: automated transport systems are not motor vehicles as defined by the law and as 
such do not have to meet this law. The 2nd interpretation would offer a window for the introduction of 
automated transport systems on public roads, but at present only the first interpretation is accepted.   
 
2.6. The certification method 
 
A complete certification program for an automated transport system will consist of a combination of 
functional tests and evaluations and a series of FMECA analyses as described here. The functional tests 
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should prove that the system does what it is supposed to do according to its specifications. The FMECA 
analyses should prove that the risks involved in system failures are within the range of acceptance.  
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Fig. 1. The certification process 
Such a certification process can be carried out when the development phase is concluded and the system 
is ready for introduction or it can start when the first concept is available and end with the final functional 
tests and analyses. The advantage of the last option is that it is very unlikely that in the last tests and 
analyses serious failures will be discovered. Such serious failures would have been detected in earlier 
phases and the design would have been adapted accordingly. If, however, a certification process starts 
when the design phase has been completed and the system is ready for introduction possible faults that are 
discovered could lead to expensive redesign and loss of time. It is therefore highly recommended to 
observe the safety life cycle and start the safety analysis process in the earliest design phases. On the basis 
of the considerations, choices and limitations described above, a basic structure for the certification 
process was designed. The structure consists of a number of process steps, each in its turn divided in sub-
steps. Figure 1 shows a graphic overview of the structure. For reasons of reproducibility, it is essential to 
carry out all of the above steps in the order given.  
 
3. Evaluation of the procedure 
 
The certification method was evaluated by applying it to the CityMobil Rome demonstrator and the 
Masdar PRT system in Abu Dhabi.  
 
The CityMobil Rome demonstrator 
The certification procedure was evaluated by using it to analyse the safety of the people mover for the 
new Rome Exhibition centre. This exhibition centre is a huge new development which is located between 
the City of Rome and Fiumicino airport. It was built between 2005 and 2008 and part of the complex is a 
very large parking area. The distance between the far parking places of this parking area and the entrances 
of the exhibition complex is up to 500 meters and it was decided to implement a driverless system to 
bring people from the parking to the entrances. In order for the Italian Ministry of Transport to certify the 
transport system for use a safety analysis was carried out on the complete system, including sub-systems 
like the communication system, the remote maintenance system and the infrastructure. The analysis was 
carried out between April 2009 and July 2009. The Italian Ministry of Transport accepted the results of 
the analysis as the main basis for its decision to certify the system. 
 
The Masdar PRT system 
Masdar City is a new sustainable city built from scratch in Abu Dhabi. The Masdar PRT system was 
designed to be the main transport system for the city. The system consists of small fully automated 
cybercars that find their way in a separate transport infrastructure at the lower city level. After the 
analysis was completed, the Ministry of transport in Abu Dhabi required an additional analysis before the 
system was accepted.  
 
In both cases a time consuming process of negotiations was necessary. These experiences show the 
importance of generally accepted procedures, which, by omitting the need for these discussions and extra 
requirements can speed up implementations significantly. 
 
In general the attendants were satisfied with the procedure and the way it was carried out. There are, 
however, a number of points of attention. The most important ones follow below: 
• The preparation process and the system definition take roughly half of the time needed for the 
complete analysis. Dividing the system in sub-systems and painstakingly defining all system 
functions is a tough and tiring job, but if it is done thoroughly it will prove to be advantageous in the 
further FMECA analysis. 
• During the analysis of the Rome people mover three persons attended all of the sessions. Some 
sessions were attended by specialists in case a certain subject was treated that required additional 
knowledge, but more often a session had to be interrupted because the opinion of some expert was 
required. For reasons of efficiency it is recommended to have experts in the session when a certain 
subject is being treated. 
• Developers that are involved in an FMECA analysis appear to have a strong tendency to start 
generating solutions when a safety flaw or something else that can be improved upon is discovered. 
It is the task of the moderator to keep the focus on the analysis of the present system. Development 
can be done in a later stage.  
 
4. Experiences with other certification procedures 
 
The CityMobil Cybus service at La Rochelle 
The city of La Rochelle is known to be among the cities with the most deployed electro mobile systems in 
France. There is a bus system, an electric vehicles car sharing system and an electric boat shuttle system. 
The Cybus system is composed of 2 electric shuttles that have been deployed during 3 months (May to 
July 2011) in a city neighborhood located between the university campus and touristic area with its 
electric boat harbor. Deploying the on-demand Cybus system in this 1.2 km long area had the advantage 
of completing the transport chain and the challenge of operating the system in a mixed urban area where 
the driverless Cybus shuttles had to cope with vehicles and pedestrians (residents and tourists) and with 
some access barriers as well. There were five stations equipped with touch screens to allow the users to 
call a Cybus while the destination could be chosen or confirmed inside the Cybus. The system was 
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developed and operated by project partner INRIA within the CityMobil project and revealed many 
challenges of different nature beside the technical of which certification was one. 
Since the maximum speed of a Cybus (25 kph) is less than the 30 kph that qualifies it as a vehicle from a 
juridical point of view, the Cybus system had to get a special authorization from the Mayor and the 
Municipality to operate. In fact, the certification process consisted of a safety evaluation to identify and 
take away possible safety risks and this authorization from the mayor. Nevertheless, because French 
regulations do not allow fully unmanned vehicles, it was necessary to keep a person inside each Cybus!  
The tricky problem of insurance (the driver, the Cybus and others) has been solved thanks to an insurance 
company that accepted the challenge and even contributed in partially sponsoring the operation 
 
The deployment of a wireless communication network has shown the necessity of having a certified and 
secure communication system operating in a crowded and “polluted” urban area with visibility issues and 
canyoning.The ground experiences revealed the necessity of having a remote Vehicle Monitoring System 
to solve conflict situations e.g. temporary road blockage, highly crowded situations, hazing, etc.  
The operator in each vehicle, besides holding the traditional finger pointed on the emergency button, had 
to explain the system to the users and conduct surveys and collect statistics. This way more than 1000 
passengers were surveyed with different ages, at different locations and different times of day. The 
feedback after 3 months of service revealed a great acceptability of the system (94%) with 73% of people 
feeling secure. Furthermore, 94% of the people were accepting the deployment of such a system in their 
city and think the system can be generalized [9][10]. 
 
The CityVIP project 
This 3-years project has been sponsored by the French National Research Agency (ANR) and the 
PREDIT. The project objectives are the development of CityVIP methodological and technological 
advances in the management of urban transport mode driver assistance but also automatic driving mode. 
The project is organized around two main axes: the development of basic functions whose availability is a 
prerequisite to any deployment of new services; the second axis is devoted to experiments that will 
validate these functions under realistic conditions foreshadowing the actual operating conditions. The 
project ended in October 2011 with demonstrations using two kinds of platforms: Cycab-like small 
electric vehicles from Robosoft used by the parties INRIA, IRISA and LASMEA; and car-like vehicles 
used by the parties UTC, LCPCP and XLIM/DMI/CANSO. Although dedicated to demonstrations in 
cities, the systems have not been tested in the city centers and did not tackle specifically the certification 
or the standardization issues. Certification was recognized as an important issue, however, and INRIA 
and LASMEA are currently submitting a joint project dedicated to the certification of mobile autonomous 
vehicles in cities and urban environments. 
 
Thanks to this experience the French company LIGIER and the LASMEA laboratory situated in 
Clermont-Ferrand have designed the VIPA (a French acronym that stands for Autonomous Individual 
Passenger Vehicle), a self-driving electric small vehicle that is being designed for use any place where 
people need a on-demand vehicle with a top speed of 20 kph (average speed it more like 10). Similar to 
the Cybus developed by INRIA the VIPA is an autonomous vehicle guided by its own sensors and 
reasoning capabilities.  
 
 
5. Future steps 
 
The certification procedure as described in Fig. 1 is a very general sketch that is recognized in the 
community. It has also shown its potential through two real examples of certification procedures leading 
to authorizations by transportation authorities. Therefore, CityMobil has shown fully automated 
transportation systems indeed can be certified. This is a milestone for the development of this industry 
because everybody sees there is a maturing market and not only technical prowess. In order for the 
procedure itself to mature and gain acceptance, more examples of systems analysed with the procedure 
are needed 
 
We identified at least two main challenges for future progress in certification: 
̵ Diversity of assistance systems; 
̵ Standardization of components. 
 
The first point addresses the needs an automated system answers to, whatever the level of automation – 
partly, highly or fully automated. Automation is not a goal per se but is a means for problems such as 
assistance for difficult driving tasks, like automated steering for docking buses, or extended 
functionalities like automated valet parking. Even though first systems will go through a customized 
certification process (as in Rome or Masdar), a sustainable automation industry will need to offer faster 
and re-usable procedures. This means to go towards categorization of automated systems at the 
application level. 
Moreover, industrialization requires a better definition of the type of systems considered, its sub-systems 
and interfaces between components. The experience of CityMobil shows that the definition of the level of 
acceptable risks is a difficult point: a single transportation authority cannot define it alone. It is finally a 
societal hence political issue. Since it is the basic starting point for declining the global risk into risks of 
subsystems, it is very important to precise the categorization of automated transportation systems (e.g. 
depending in the level of automation) and their decomposition (e.g. in perception-planning-control).  
 
The second point – standardization of components – is a technical answer to the complexity raised by the 
needs, i.e. the first point. There are many techniques to answer technical problems (e.g. perception), some 
of them very mature, but the variety of systems you can create with such blocks is huge. One typical 
example is the Internet where the diversity is almost infinite but protocols are rather simple (TCP/IP, 
HTTP…). This shows the power of an appropriate set of standards; an evolving set of course, but 
compliant with a general architecture (for Internet Protocols the base view are the famous ISO layers). 
This approach has been pushed by Europe and is currently adopted globally for ITS systems. However the 
global architecture is not finalized even though parts of it are in a pretty good state (e.g. ITS 
communication stack). Terminology, components and interfaces are defined in standardization 
organizations (ISO TC204, ETSI TC ITS…) with a clear will of all regions to have a consistent set of 
standards all around the world. 
This question raises also the link between cybercars and the rest of the transportation community. A few 
years ago, cybercars were considered as scientific toys. We believed there would be a convergence 
between fully automated vehicles that would increasingly be allowed to drive more and more on open 
roads until they can be allowed on public roads and between “normal” vehicles that would support more 
and more the driver until full automation is reached. Life went faster than expected and we see mixture 
instead of convergence. Specific automated functionalities are integrated into traditional cars (e.g. 
automated parking) using “cybercars technology”. This means automation arrives through partial 
applications taking subsystems from fully automated vehicles architecture. This is a great news but also a 
challenge: the cybercar community will have to speak the same language (AUTOSAR for electronics, 
IEC or ISO for safety, etc.). 
 
Finally, a last challenge due to mixture of automation and human driving is the interface. In the 2011 
Frankfort Motor Show, VALEO demonstrated its automated parking system supervised through a 
smartphone! Mines ParisTech and INRIA demonstrated with VALEO a prototype of “iPad Steer” where 
the steering wheel is replaced by an iPad (final demonstration of French AROS project). Interfaces are a 
key component in an automated system supervised by human; and such systems are highly desirable in an 
aging society but push further all questions around certification. The questions raised are then: Who is 
driving? What is automated? What is automated driving? 
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